FW: Letter from Bill Bell, former Chief, US Office for POW/MIA Affairs , Vietnam

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Robert Serge

VVA 17 Member

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Subject: Fwd: Fw: Letter from Bill Bell, former Chief, US Office for POW/MIA Affairs , Vietnam

--Forwarded Message Attachment--
From: richardandshirley@netzero.net
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 23:17:21 +0000
To: rserge@vva17lasvegas.org
Subject: Fw: Letter from Bill Bell, former Chief, US Office for POW/MIA Affairs , Vietnam

October, 6, 2014

Garnett E. Bell

Lavaca, AR 72941

billbell@pinncom.com

TO: Committee on Mismanagement of Prisoner-of-War (POW/MIA) Accounting

I have been compiling a list for proposals aimed at resolving the POW/MIA issue by achieving the fullest Possible Accounting. This letter is being forwarded to the Committee on Mismanagement of Prisoner-of-War (POW/MIA) Accounting.  You can probably imagine that I gained a great deal of experience on this issue while serving on the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) during the ceasefire.  I also served as the Chief of the US Office for POW/MIA Affairs in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Vietnam after the war ended. I spent some 12 years in the search and recovery effort and some 359 Americans were recovered, repatriated and identified during the time that I worked on the issue. What is going on now in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is one of several reasons I chose to salute and go home.  My personal view is that so long as we are willing to be extorted (milked) for large sums of cash going to the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) POW/MIA Chapter (yes, they do have one, just like Wal-Mart in China), we will never resolve the issue.  If we keep financing the General Political Directorate (GPD) there will be no incentive on the part of the VCP to provide an accounting.  On the other hand, however, if the VCP collapses, the Vietnamese people will provide genuine cooperation in resolving the issue.  Unfortunately however, the non-repentant  GPD and Central Military Commission in Hanoi are be reluctant to afford genuine cooperation on this sensitive issue, because in their eyes we have not settled our "blood debt".

Rather than dangerous and expensive search operations, what we desperately need now is the conduct of professional investigations of missing persons cases applicable to those cases wherein the missing, or otherwise unaccounted-for personnel were last known to be alive, especially in those cases where the missing men were in the actual physical custody of communist forces. 

Communists cringe every time someone says "the Viet Cong won the war and America lost."  They know we killed 1.3 million of their personnel and we bombed North and Central Vietnam to shambles. The  During our long war with Hanoi, Communist forces suffered 300,000 personnel "Killed-in-Action, Body-not-Recovered" (KIA/BNR).  Today, some 150,000 bodies of Communist personnel remain unrecovered.  There has been so much violence and bloodshed between the United States and its Allies and the Communists in Vietnam that I doubt we will change negative attitudes and hatred any time in the near future and most likely until far into the future. I realize that there is little or no animosity between the SRV civilian citizens.  But this is not true for members of the VCP.

I believe the only way we can ever resolve the issue is to change our position on all WWII cases and categorize them as inactive, if for no other reason based on the passage of time.  The same criteria should apply for cases in Vietnam where there is adequate information, even including in some cases,  American citizen witnesses.  Concerning losses in deep ocean, or high speed, sharp angle impacts into remote, mountainous terrain, I believe it is incredibly ingenious to risk the lives of additional American personnel in order to go look for bones, especially when the United States Government (USG) is being gouged for millions of dollars annually for rental costs for the unsafe, obsolete, Communist supplied aircraft.  You are probably aware that one Russian helicopter carrying a joint team of US/Vietnam remains specialists from JPAC, crashed into a mountain in Central Vietnam killing everyone on board.  Had I extended my assignment in Vietnam any longer it is quite likely that I would have been killed along with the others. 

After having contemplated the current POW/MIA situation at considerable length I have gradually come to the conclusion that the only way to successfully resolve the remaining cases is to have all parties agree to and carefully implement a completely transparent program designed to a address the issue of casualty resolution as being an entirely humanitarian issue.  All documentation and reporting on the POW/MIA program must be declassified and transparency on the part of all parties involved will be mandatory, with consequences for parties that violate or exploit the humanitarian program. In resolving casualties, rather than pressure the U.S. Government to pay exorbitant sums for a huge cast of laborers and specialists and require the U.S. Government to hand over cash, the USG should partner with Nongovernment Organizations to do field work to investigate the loss incidents of U.S. personnel unaccounted-for throughout former Indochina.

Garnett "Bill" Bell

4209 Boys Ranch Road

Lavaca, AR 72941-4726

The purpose of this letter is to request your assistance in reorganizing and improving the important ongoing effort toward accounting for America's heroes held Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA). 

I am Garnett "Bill" Bell, a retired civil servant and the former Chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Vietnam.  My impetus for this request is an August 1, 2013, Hearing held in the U.S. Senate.  A preliminary investigation revealed considerable mismanagement by the two primary organizations responsible for accounting for America's un-returned veterans: the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) and the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Person Office (DPMO). 

In the near future I will follow-up this request with a related evaluation of a complex, still unresolved, wartime missing persons case involving several U.S. Army personnel assigned to the same unit.  These young soldiers were lured to capture by female Vietnamese Communist "Special Action" personnel and they have never been recovered. Subsequent reporting indicated that these men were captured alive and moved to their detention point located in large underground cave/bunker complex. To the best of my knowledge no American officials have ever inspected or examined the underground facilities located in the area of the infamous "My Lai Massacre".

Training sessions in wartime Vietnam to prepare young, lonely, isolated American soldiers to avoid being lured to capture were virtually non-existent. In accounting for America's un-returned veterans in Southeast Asia, however, rather than digging for bone chips at aircraft crash sites already gleaned by Communist recovery specialists in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the accounting effort must also include investigations into the cases involving the Intelligence and Security Services, especially those involving personnel who were classified as "Last-Known-Alive." Numerous U.S. personnel involved in Special Operations have never been heard from subsequent to their loss incidents, especially cross-border operations with loss incidents in third countries. Most of the individuals in this category were classified "presumed dead" with little or no evidence, other than the passage of time.  

While working on the complex POW/MIA issue I have frequently been asked by POW/MIA family members, veterans and concerned citizens "why would the Communists continue to hold American POWs after the announced ceasefire and the release of POWs by all sides in early 1973?"  In my opinion one valid reason is due to the fact that at the time of the POW exchangesome50ofthemostdangerousCommunistwartimePOWswerebeingsecretlydetainedbydepartment "Q" oftheCentralSpecialCommissionoftheRepublicofVietnam'sIntelligenceandSecurityServices(Phudacuytrunguong).

Another important reason is because in 1973, when the POWs were exchanged, the Communists did not have a clue that they would be able to invade and occupy the former RVN as quickly as they did during early 1975.  In 1973, not knowing how much longer the war would drag on, the Communists would most likely have continued to hold at least some US POWs for future negotiations with the US and RVN.  This is especially important when we consider that the Communists had two delegations of Communist negotiators, who were potential hostages, quartered inside Tan Son Nhat Airbase in Saigon.

A live POW can be maintained for only a few pennies per day.  This was proven throughout the entire Vietnam war. Costs for minimum rations fed to POWs pale in comparison to the costs of research and development for producing sophisticated weapon systems and aircraft without American experts to assist in the exploitation process. When aircraft are captured virtually intact, such as the F-111 in Vietnam, the process of reverse engineering can be greatly simplified by exploiting U.S. personnel trained to operate those aircraft and weapons systems. 

Aside from that, it is a known fact that the Communists illegally executed American POWs.  In rare instances American forces reportedly killed Communist POWs and detainees.  Due to a lack of refrigeration, the communist forces occasionally kept some American POWs in remote locations for periodic use for blood transfusions for the treatment of wounded communist personnel.  Like recent violent acts perpetrated on Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, similar operstions were conducted by both the Americans and the Communists on each other during the Vietnam War. However, the terminology used was somewhat different, since incidents involving terror tactics were called Special Actions (Dac Cong) by the Communists, while the Americans preferred to use the term "Special Operations". 

Special Actions conducted by the Communists were under the direct control of the various Communist Party Committees, especially in cities where Special Action Committees killed and maimed Americans with bombs placed in movie theaters, nightclubs, aircraft, vehicles, hospitals and sleeping quarters. Special Operations by U.S. Forces were directed at the theater level, and at times the national level. Special Operations by US Forces included raids to capture live Sources for interrogation, intelligence gathering missions where listening devices were installed and monitored, and some captured ammunition sabotaged and left in place to maim, kill and disfigure capturing communist forces, or cause them to lose confidence in their Chinese/Sovit supplied munitions. 

There was also the deployment of pilotless aircraft (drones) as part of the classified "Buffalo Hunter" project.  This project produced valuable information on US POW camps in northern Vietnam.  I was able to analyze and utilize some of the aerial imagery taken of wartime POW camps in Hanoi by the unmanned, single combustion engine drones. This low-level imagery proved to be very valuable to me and other American personnel working on the POW/MIA accounting issue. 

After years of searching for missing personnel in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia I have finally come to the conclusion that the current system of accounting will never achieve the fullest possible accounting.  With both sides concerned with war crimes, such as the My Lai incident, in a situation where there is no statute of limitations it will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain details concerning the actual fate of friendly and enemy personnel, who were captured, interrogated and evacuated to rear areas.  I firmly believe that the only way to satisfactorily resolve the issue of America's un-returned veterans is to form a Commission for Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Healing. 

The incredibly horrific crimes committed by both sides will likely never be completely forgiven, but the former adversaries can at least begin the healing process by all sides agreeing to treat the accounting for POWs and MIAs as an entirely humanitarian issue with completely transparent funding under Title 10, USC. Additional funding may be provided by 501c3 veterans service organizations (VSOs) and POW/MIA  organizations.  A wartime effort by the RVN and the Provisional Revolutionary Government's (PRG) Commission on National Reconciliation and Concord failed in 1973 when both sides refused to cease fighting. Both sides were determined to gain additional territory in order to control and manipulate a future election designed to unify the country.

Such efforts were only slightly more successful when similar agreements faltered in South Africa in 1995 and 96. Eventually, however, some progress was achieved.  Such a commission will also afford America an opportunity to demand fair treatment for our former allies, the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines of the RVN Armed Forces that fought alongside American personnel.  Unlike the communists, our former Allies of the RVNAF have never been granted status as "Veterans." To the contrary, in the postwar era their families have been exploited, neglected and abused.  It is past time that American veterans man-up and cease the sickening hug and weep ceremonies where arriving challenged American veterans grovel before Communist officials at airports across Vietnam.  I believe it is finally time for us to begin to remember the some 125,000 RVNAF personnel who also gave their lives in the long American War in Vietnam. Vietnamese veterans organizations all around the world are most likely anxious to begin efforts toward recovering and identifying the remains of former RVNAF personnel throughout former Indochina. 

One important part of the national casualty resolution effort is the investigation and resolution of some 305 high priority "last-known-alive" (LKA) cases.  Many of these cases have incident locations in Central Vietnam, especially the Danang area.  Although there are many cases involving combat operations requiring excavation and the processing of human skeletal remains by forensic anthropologists, deontologists and other experts, there is also a significant number of cases involving subversion and espionage.  In many of these cases young American personnel were lured to capture or execution by "Special Action" personnel, primarily female, on the premise of potential sexual relations with the agents. In most cases American troops never realized they were being lured.  This includes those personnel who narrowly escaped death due to the sudden appearance of friendly forces or because Military Police escorted them back to their camp or fighting positions before they could be captured or executed by communist Special Action units. In hindsight I can recall two clear instances where I was almost lured to capture.  In both instances, a last minute "gut feeling" saved my life.  I only wish that others could have been as fortunate.  To the best of my knowledge American troops were never properly trained to recognize subversion and "Special Actions."  These cases can only be resolved based on investigations conducted by experienced missing persons investigators. 

Forexample,inthewartimeDanangareaaU.S.MilitaryIntelligenceunitwasresponsibleforthecollectionofintelligenceinformation,includingthatrelatedtoPOW/MIA. Unfortunately,however,theclandestineAmericanintelligenceagentsassignedtotheMIunitinDananglivedandworkedinacompletelycompromisedofficelocatedinanoldFrencheravillaindowntownDanang. TheownerofthelargevillawasProfessorHoAn,(akaHoHuuAn),acleverspywhoworkedsecretlyfortheCommunistMilitaryRegion5PartyCommitteeandtheRegionalSecurityCommittee,whileprofessingtoworkfortheRVN'sUniversityofForeignLanguagesinDanang. ToprovidemaidservicesfortheAmericanintelligencepersonnelProfessorHoAnhemployedayoungVietnameseladycalled "Hoa."

Ho Anh also deployed young English-speaking Vietnamese female students from the Danang University of Foreign Languages into the American in-country rest and recuperation center (R&R) at My Khe  (called China Beach by the Americans), in the Hoi An area in order to lure American personnel to capture.  Some of these relationships were developed through initial casual contacts with Vietnamese females who, like the young American servicemen, joined the local Vietnamese-American Cultural Association (Hoi Viet My). Professor Ho An also held the position of Political Indoctrination Officer for the Military Region 5 Camp for US and Foreign POWs. 

Some 30 US and foreign personnel, including German and Korean nationals, including nurses from the Knights of Malta humanitarian organization, were lured to capture by Vietnamese nurses who were secretly working for Professor Ho Anh. Although some of the POWs died due to illness and malnutrition at least some survivors were eventually released. The fates of some 50 other young, naive Americans, who were lured to capture, have never been resolved.  This is despite the fact that compelling subsequent information indicates they were alive and in the custody of, or in close proximity to, communist forces at the time of their loss incidents. Many of these young Americans were able to visit the in-country Rest and Recuperation (R&R) facility at My Khe.  

One undercover agent working the China Beach area at the time was LTC Nguyen Van Be, who also worked as an Interrogation Officer in the MR-5 POW Camp.  LTC Be is the officer who exploited PFC Robert Garwood, a well known collaborator and former USMC PFC assigned as a jeep driver for the 3rd MAF G-2 section in the Danang area. After the war ended LTC Be became manager of the MR-5 Guesthouse, which later became the site of the luxurious Furama Hotel where American personnel from the American Embassy or the JPAC currently stay for $175.00 per night. The last time I was able to visit this facility was in February, 2004, when I went there as a Senior Policy Adviser with a Congressional Delegation (Codel) from the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

During that visit I was able to briefly interview one former senior communist cadre and also another "Ho" brother, Ho Huu Phuoc, aka Ho Nghinh.  He lives across the street from the Furama Hotel.  For some time I had wanted to interview, Ho Huu Nghia, aka Dinh Ba Thi, former Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. After being caught red-handed in espionage operations involving American officials recruited as spies, Ambassador Dinh Ba Thi was deported and declared "persona non-gratta" by the U.S. State Department. During the 2004 visit I was informed that Ambassador Thi had been killed in a tragic "automobile accident." I had also planned to interview former Public Security Colonel and POW Camp Commander, Hoang Xuan Lai, but learned that like Dinh Ba Thi, Colonel Lai had also been killed in a similar automobile accident. Another "Ho" brother from Danang, Ho Liem, aka Hoang Bich Son, former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York was also unavailable. I had met Hoang Bich Son in 1994 when I went to Vietnam with Muhammad Ali, but at that time the atmosphere was not conducive to detailed interviews of senior communist cadre. Moreover, the main purpose of the visit was to permit Muhammad Ali to use his good offices and influence to encourage the communists to assist in accounting for missing American and other foreign, third-country personnel. I am currently working on a plan designed to "jumpstart" the upcoming Senate Committee Hearing to investigate alleged POW/MIA Accounting Mismanagement. 

In order to prepare a mechanism whereby the fullest possible accounting can be achieved, I believe an International Commission on wartime casualties, whereby certain parties involved will be proactive in conducting missing persons investigations, primarily the U.S. and the SRV, while other parties, further separated by geography and the passage of time, e.g. Russia, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic(LPDR) and Cambodia can be considered reactive based on usable information becoming available. According to the plan, all parties involved will stipulate a joint agreement unilaterally declaring the issue to be entirely humanitarian in nature, operated completely by non-government organizations (NGOs) and completely transparent.  Rather than the previous stacks of cash for cooperation, any helpful Communist countries will benefit from humanitarian projects funded by grants from a joint international fund, in much the same manner as the Department of Defense (DoD) currently conducts similar missions under Title 10.USC.

This international commission can be organized similar to what has previously been organized in Africa, where there was, and still is, considerable hatred due to violence and bloodshed in the past.  Such an organization would similarly be referred to as a commission for "Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Healing." This arrangement would bypass pockets of resistance, including the the thorny issue of war crimes, because there is no statute of limitations for war crimes. 

My final product will include a series of proposals for the Committee on Mismanagement of Prisoner-of-War (POW/MIA) Accounting. I believe I have gained a great deal of experience on this issue while serving on the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) at the time of the ceasefire, and as the Chief of the US Office for POW/MIA Affairs in the SRV after the war ended. I spent some 12 years in the search and recovery effort and some 359 Americans were recovered, repatriated and identified during the time that I worked on the issue. What is going on now in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is one of several reasons that in 1993, I elected to salute and go home.  My personal view is that so long as we are willing to be extorted (milked) for large sums of cash going to the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) POW/MIA Chapter we will never resolve the issue.  If we keep financing the Vietnam Communist Party Central Military Commission's General Political Directorate (GPD) there will be no incentive on the part of the VCP to provide an accounting. 

On the other hand, however, if the VCP collapses, the Vietnamese people will most likely be willing to provide genuine cooperation in resolving the issue.  Moreover, the GPD and Central Military Commission in Hanoi will be reluctant to afford genuine cooperation on this sensitive issue, because in their eyes we have not settled our "blood debt". While in Vietnam I noticed that communist officials often cringe whenever someone says "the Viet Cong won the war and America lost."  They know we killed 1.3 million of their personnel and we bombed Northern and Central Vietnam into oblivion. The Communists suffered 300,000 personnel "Killed-in-Action, Body-not-Recovered" (KIA/BNR).  Today, some 150,000 bodies of Communist personnel remain unrecovered.  There has been so much violence and bloodshed between the U.S. and its Allies and the Communists in Vietnam that it will be difficult at best to change negative attitudes of VCP members in the SRV. I know there is little or no animosity between the SRV civilian citizens, but this is not true for members of the hard-core VCP. I believe the only way we can ever resolve the accounting issue is to change our position on all WWII cases and categorize them as non-recoverable, if for no other reason based on the passage of time.  The same goes for cases in Vietnam where there is extant adequate information, especially in cases with American witnesses, to be certain the missing man is no longer alive.

Concerning losses in deep ocean, or high speed, sharp angle impacts into remote, mountainous terrain, to me it is foolish to risk the lives of American personnel in order to go look for bones, especially when the U.S. Government is being gouged for millions of dollars annually for rental costs for obsolete, Communist-supplied aircraft.  You are probably aware that since my departure from Vietnam, a Russian helicopter carrying a joint team of US/Vietnam remains specialists from JPAC, crashed into a mountain in Central Vietnam killing everyone on board.  Had I extended my assignment in Vietnam any longer it is quite likely that I would have been killed along with the others. The message here is obvious: stop killing American and Vietnamese personnel while searching for bones.  We must eventually accept the fact the "all the bones in Vietnam are not worth the life of one live American." American civilians who performed other than normal military duties were included in the security system. These personnel were considered as "spies," and subjected to very thorough interrogations.

Even American female volunteer workers, like the school teachers and medical specialists captured in Hue during the 1968 "Tet" offensive, were suspected of being "spies." Although they were able to convince their captors that they were genuine volunteers, they were required to sign statements to be broadcast over Radio Hanoi, and then were released back to American control. The radio broadcasts were made from Hanoi only days after the statements were recorded near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In other cases, those prisoners who were not successful in explaining their backgrounds either disappeared, died in captivity due to brutal interrogations, or were executed after capture.  Chief Warrant Officer Solomon Godwin, from Hot Springs, in your home state of Arkansas, also captured in Hue, died while undergoing a lengthy period of interrogation by the Public Security Police.

Due to his assignment as an Intelligence Advisor to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) National Police Special Branch in Hue, both CWO Godwin and captured CIA agent Eugene Weaver were held in a highly secret camp far removed from other American prisoners. Mr. Weaver survived the ordeal, and more recently the Vietnamese admitted to U.S. officials that not only did the Soviet KGB have direct access to Mr. Weaver for interrogation in Vietnam, the KGB also attempted to recruit him for intelligence operations in the United States. Although an American eyewitness account provides proof that CWO Godwin was in the custody of communist forces at a fixed location, neither he nor his remains have been returned. 

Ihavealreadyprovidedcomplimentarycopiesofmybook "LeaveNomanBehind:BillBellandtheSearchforAmericanPOWsandMIAsfromtheVietnamWar" toyourstaff. Ibelieveyouandmembersofyourstaffcanbenefitgreatlybyreadingmyverydetailedaccountofwhathastranspiredthroughouttheprocessofaccountingforourun-returnedAmericanheroes. IfyouneedadditionalcopiesofmybookpleasehaveyourstaffcontactmeASAP.Withtheassistanceofyourstaff,IwouldliketodonatecomplimentarycopiesofmybooktoanymembersoftheU.S.SenateinterestedinresolvingPOW/MIAdebacle. Garnett'Bill'Bell,anativeofTexasandaretiredGM-14,DoD,wenttoVietnamasariflemanin1965andservedfourtoursthere. Billwasawardedsome20individualdecorationsandnumerousunitawards.HelaterservedasaninstructorintheDepartmentofExploitationandCounterintelligence,U.S.ArmyIntelligenceCenterandschool.Duringhiscareerheservedinthe327thand506thParachuteInfantryRegimentsofthe101stAirborneDivision,the1/35thInfantryRegiment,25thInfantryDivision,thethe101stMilitaryIntelligenceCompany,the525thMilitaryIntelligenceGroup,theDefenseLanguageInstitute,the6thSpecialForcesGroup,theJointCasualtyResolutionCenter(JCRC),theFourPartyJointMilitaryTeam(FPJMT)andtheJointTaskForceFull-Accounting. Bill'swifeandsonwerekilledandadaughtercriticallyinjuredinApril1975,whenthefamiliesofU.S.officialsassignedtotheAmericanEmbassyinSaigonwereevacuatedinconjunctionwiththe'OperationBabylift'program.

AfterbeingevacuatedbyhelicopterfromtheroofoftheAmericanEmbassyonthefinaldayoftheRepublicofVietnam(RVN),(30April1975),BillreturnedtopostwarVietnamasthefirstofficialU.S.representativeafterthewarendedwhenhewasassignedastheChiefoftheU.S.OfficeforPOW/MIAAffairsinHanoi.Heservedmorethan12yearsonthePOW/MIASearchTeams.QualifiedasAirborne-Ranger,SCUBAdiverandJumpmaster,BilleventuallybecameamemberoftheCongressionalStaff,U.S.HouseofRepresentatives.FluentinVietnamese,ThaiandLaotian,BillisagraduateofChaminadeUniversityandtheauthorof'LeaveNoManBehind.'(Amazon-Ebay).BillisalifememberoftheDAV,VFW,CombatInfantrymen'sAssociation(CIA)andtheMilitaryOrderofthePurpleHeart(MOPH).SubsequenttohisfederalretirementBillhasservedasanInvestigatorinthe12thJudicialDistrict,WesternArkansas.

Subject: Leave No man Behind: Introduction by George "Jay" Veith

Many people have asked me over the years why I became involved in the POW/MIA issue.  I wanted to help the families was my answer, which was true then and remains true today.  Anyone who spends even an hour with a family would have a hard time not wanting to help.  Not only is their pain still palpable, the sheer frustration of not knowing what happened to their father, son, brother, or husband, and worse, being so powerless to solve the mystery , resonates a particular helplessness that any listener would want to comfort.  Still, after many meetings and long hours spent studying and researching the issue, it dawned on me that there was another, more subtle, reason that drove me beyond mere outrage at what had happened to many American families.  It is the sense of meeting a national commitment, an awareness of honoring those who came before us and who sacrificed everything.

That sense of national honor is personified in Garnett "Bill" Bell, a man who, as the U.S. Government's top POW/MIA field investigator in Southeast Asia for many years, doggedly pursued the answers to the fate of over twenty-five hundred Americans missing from the Vietnam War.  It was his ability to articulate precisely why this quest was so important that compelled me to continue to seek answers.  That is why we wrote this book---to help the American people truly grasp the evolution of the POW/MIA issue, and to show whom the real culprits are---the cold hearted rulers of Hanoi.  During Bell's career some three hundred and fifty Americans were recovered and identified; this detailed account of the many trials and tribulations encountered attempting to identify those missing men, as well as the events that ultimately caused him to seek retirement and abandon his official involvement in this noble effort, will help the American people understand the history of the issue, the possible fate of some MIAs, and why this matter continues unresolved.

I first met Bill Bell at the annual National League of POW/MIA Families meeting in July 1994.  I was just beginning to work on what later became my first book, Codename Bright Light: the Untold Story of U.S. POW rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War.  I had called him shortly after he had retired and moved back to Arkansas from Thailand.  After I introduced myself and asked to interview him at the meeting, he graciously accepted and then rather unexpectedly told me to "come on down to Ft. Smith" and stay a few days with him.  Surprised by his spontaneous gesture, I politely declined due to work reasons, but inside I was stunned at his desire to help a complete stranger, which was light years from the suspicious activists I had met as I first tried to learn the issue.

Our talk that day eventually grew into a close friendship and close working relationship.  In speaking with Bill, over time I developed a fascination with the nuances of a subject on the surface so simple yet so breathtakingly complex.  For me, learning the full history of the POW/MIA issue (which in Bell's view ---beyond the moral component---was a matter of national security), was akin to peering behind the curtain, like Dorothy in Wizard of Oz, and discovering unseen powers at work.

Over the years the issue devolved into three camps: a small group of families and activists hardened by frustration and convinced that successive administrations were covering up a horrendous crime---the abandonment of hundreds of American prisoners to the Communists; a larger group of families less suspicious of the accounting effort but desperately wanting an answer, and a bureaucracy often trying to do the right thing , but hamstrung by national policies ill suited to a democratic society's demands for results.  Despite the best intentions, however, often it appeared that some in the bureaucracy sought to control the issue for their own personal agenda, responding in a knee-jerk fashion to the slightest whiff of criticism, some of it justified, some not.  At the other end of the spectrum, for a few other Americans, the issue became their Holy Grail, and as with most fanatics, reason and truth played no part in their worldview, only embellished tales and the spun fantasies of con men.  The attention of the American public, unable to follow the intricacies, ebbed and flowed like the tide.  As time passed or each new hot revelation was explained away, the nation slowly developed "compassion fatigue" and turned away from the anguish.

Bell is in the middle, seeing neither some vast conspiracy to abandon hundreds of American soldiers nor understanding why the truth could be so difficult to accept, that most likely some Americans were kept prisoner by the North Vietnamese after the war, or that they could rapidly account for many missing Americans if they made the political decision to do so.

No doubt this book will rankle some current and former government POW/MIA bureaucrats along with many activists.  Both groups want the public to see the issue from their perspective, and they manipulate the data to achieve that context.  Much of the still on-going debate revolves around the "live-prisoner" issue.  To be clear there is little doubt that most men died in their incident or shortly thereafter.  For about half the missing men, witnesses saw the deaths, and  battlefield emergencies prevented their compatriots from recovering their remains.  Nevertheless, for many others major questions, and when placed within the framework of the well-known Communist Vietnamese efforts to  to exploit American POWs for diplomatic concessions, or their remains and personal effects for financial rewards , these questions become deeply disturbing.  "Only Hanoi knows," claimed the bumper sticker from years ago, a phrase more apt than the vast majority of Americans comprehended then or today. 

What is most difficult for the newcomer reading this book and listening to the various commentators to understand is that much of the intelligence on the missing men is not black or white, but multiple shades of gray, which in combination with a seemingly implacable foe who controlled the old battlefields and who was determined to use this leverage to extract concessions from from its imperialist enemy, created questions seemingly impervious to American efforts to answer. This "grayness" enables certain people to slant their analysis on the POW/MIA perspective a particular way, claiming selected facts reveal the truth, which of course, is the truth as they want to see it.  Plus, a cottage industry peculiar to Southeast Asia of bone hunters seeking rewards and working in a culture where embroidered hearsay is far more prevalent than a Westernized version of truthfulness, have led to years of wild tales and dead-ends.  This book is designed to help the American public see through the smoke and mirrors, to understand precisely what occurred and understand the missteps that were made. 

This chronicle details the many events surrounding the career of Bill Bell, from his time as a young infantryman going to war in 1965 to his retirement in 1993.  It is his memoirs, not an in-depth examination of the POW/MIA issue from a policy level.  While the book recounts most of the major actions and organizational changes that influenced the U.S. Government's handling of the issue, it is written solely from his perspective as a witness to these historical proceedings.  His account is designed to amplify the record, to provide one insider's account, to the extent memory and documentation are able, so that future generations may know and understand his role in the monumental task of recovering our soldiers and civilians who went missing from the conflagration known as the Vietnam War.  Without a doubt many other people served with distinction and honor.  Their omission reflects not any overarching role by Bell, but are simply far too numerous to mention.

One might reasonably ask, then, who is Bill Bell and why is he significant?  What makes his voice unique, his experiences fascinating, his knowledge vital, and his analysis of the issue and the Vietnamese Communist plans so critical?  The answer is simply this: for all the people who have worked or toiled in the U.S. Government's efforts to account for the nation's missing men in Southeast Asia, Bill Bell is the only government official who has been directly involved in every aspect of the complex issue at each stage of the events that unfolded over the years.  Only someone with Bell's dogged perseverance and his encyclopedic knowledge of the Vietnamese Communists , combined with his fluency in the various regional languages, could hope to penetrate the system the Communists had created to essentially milk a humanitarian effort for revenue to support themselves.  Patience and persistence, traits more often associated with Asian mentality than the go-getting Americans, along with Sun Tzu's famous dictum to know one's enemy, allowed Bill Bell the opportunity to get close to the heart of the mystery.  In particular, Bell's candor and unflinching honesty won him an extraordinary trust among the families, a rarity for a government official working in the issue.  While the family organizations counted upon Bell to protect their interests, as a government official in a politically sensitive position, it was a trait that did not always endear him to his superiors. 

Perhaps to give the reader a sense of the families' anguish, to comprehend a man like Bell to sacrifice so much is an almost Don Quixoteesque pursuit of the truth, let me provide what was for me what was an epiphany into the families' sorrow.  On the day I was to meet Bell at the hotel where the National League of Families was holding their annual get-together, I dropped off my bags in my room.  Realizing I left my notebook in my car in the basement-parking garage, I rode the elevator back down to retrieve it .  On the way back up, the car stopped at the lobby.  As the door opened, an elderly couple tried to enter.  Seeing they were straining with a large suitcase, I offered to assist them, which the lady quietly accepted.  They walked inside, each taking a spot on opposite sides of me.  As the door closed on the three of us, I spotted a badge on the woman's jacket.  Not clearly reading the text, I asked her "what brings you here?"  The woman said nothing.  She looked away from me, her gaze drifting down to the floor.  In a soft voice from the other side of the car, her husband's voice answered:  "Our son."

As I turned to look at him, it was then that I could clearly read the badge on his shirt---"National League of POW/MIA Families."  I could hear the strain in his voice, an emotion that clipped off further words, as if he wanted to say something more, but was unable to explain to a complete stranger thirty years of anguish over a missing child, to make me understand why they kept coming to a POW/MIA Family meeting, desperate for answers, when surely there was no hope of their son being alive.  Nothing more was said.  The car went up five and they got off.  I felt foolish for asking a seemingly innocent question: I wish I could have said something, but like them, I, too, was helpless.  I saw them at subsequent meetings,  but I never spoke to them again.  I doubt they would even remember me, but I never forgot them. 

Bill Bell tried desperately, as hard as any man can over a period of many years, to find the answer to what happened to the son of those grieving parents, and the sons and brothers and husbands of many other American families.  From his days as a young infantryman on covert missions into enemy areas in the Central Highlands, to receiving the American POWs as part of "Operation Homecoming," to assisting with the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon until the morning of April 30, 1975, one of the last Americans to get into a waiting helicopter as the North Vietnamese Army tanks rolled into the defeated city, to slogging his way for almost a decade visiting forlorn, malaria-ridden camps to interview hapless refugees, to his return as the first U.S. Government representative assigned to Vietnam as Chief of the U.S. POW/MIA office, to his televised testimony in front of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs where Bell told Congress, as the government's top POW/MIA expert , that he believed the Communists had held man prisoner after the formal release, Bell saw it all.

In human terns, however, despite his incredible experiences, for him it was not without cost. He learned first-hand the pain of those families, in a way none of us ever want to experience, when he lost his own wife and son in the crash of an American plane evacuating Vietnamese orphans and American dependents on April 4, 1975.  No doubt his personality unconsciously reflects the struggles and suffering of over 25 years of dealing with a cunning and ruthless enemy, who, despite today's fashionable rhetoric about healing the past, remain committed to monopolizing Vietnam's political power.  Still, despite his loss and the almost insurmountable difficulties of trying to get answers from a foe determined not to provide them, Bell persevered, not only for the POW/MIA families, but also for America.  In a sense, it was for all our families, but the cost of persistence is high, and Bill Bell has paid a full measure.

This is his story. (available for $10 from Amazon & Ebay)